Biodiversity protection in private forests: PES schemes, institutions and prosocial behaviour
Jens Abildtrup  1@  , Anne Stenger, Francis De Morogues, Philippe Polome  2@  , Marieke Blondet, Claude Michel@
1 : Bureau d\'Économie Théorique et Appliquée  (BETA)  -  Website
Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique
Université de Lorraine, UFR Droit Sciences Economiques et Gestion, 13 place Carnot CO 70026, 54035 Nancy CedexUniversité de Strasbourg, Faculté des Sciences Economiques et de Gestion, 61 avenue de la Forêt Noire 67085 Strasbourg Cedex -  France
2 : Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique  (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne)  -  Website
École Normale Supérieure (ENS) - Lyon, Université Lumière - Lyon II, Université Claude Bernard - Lyon I (UCBL), CNRS : UMR5824, Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne, PRES Université de Lyon
93, chemin des Mouilles 69130 Écully --- 6, rue Basse des Rives 42023 Saint-Étienne cedex 02 -  France

The overall research question addresses the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms in policies enhancing private forest owners' biodiversity protection. In particular, the project focuses on the link between forest owners' motivations, incentives, and institutions and questions the incentives of the current biodiversity protection policies. Our hypothesis is that the purely monetary nature of the incentives can cause a "crowding out effect", i.e. forest owners may reduce their voluntary contribution to biodiversity protection that is driven by pro-social motivations (altruism, self-image, etc.). On this background as well as knowledge obtained in this project about forest owners' motivations, we are searching for combinations of "incentive mechanisms” (monetary and non-monetary) and “institutions” (national and local authorities, NGOs etc) which are most effective in making forest owners adopting biodiversity protection measures in their forests.


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