Consequentiality and sample size in stated preferences

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Abstract

In stated preference studies, consequentiality is expected to increase the validity of the results, where consequentiality means that respondents believe that the survey outcome will have real-life consequences. Sample size has received little attention so far in this literature. In an online single-bounded dichotomous choice field study dealing with underwater turbines, we provide information on sample size to a part of participants, where the information varies across participants. We find that sample size information has no effect on subjective consequentiality, which suggests that consequential single-bounded contingent valuation studies can still ensure incentive-compatible behavior when the benefits from voting becomes very small.

Keywords: consequentiality, incentive compatibility, sample size, contingent valuation

1 Introduction

Discrete choice experiment (DCE) surveys, based on stated preferences, are employed in many fields, including environmental and health economics, transportation, to reveal the value of public goods to the society. The value estimates find

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application in various areas, such as assessment of benefits for cost-benefit analyses of public policy projects or loss estimation in litigation processes over natural damages.

However, there exist important concerns about the validity of stated preference surveys: it has been argued that in case of many surveys, the best strategy for rational participants when responding to the valuation task is not necessarily to respond truthfully. To improve the validity of stated-preference-based value estimates, Carson and Groves (2007) defined conditions necessary for truthful preference revelation. These conditions include the use of a single binary choice format in a discrete choice survey and consequentiality, which means that respondents believe that the survey outcome will have real-life consequences on the probability of the public good provision (often referred to as policy consequentiality) and on the probability of the related payment collection (often referred to as payment consequentiality). Subsequent work has developed further advancements to the conditions. Vossler et al. (2012) emphasized that respondents should believe that there are chances that each yes-or-no (binary) choice in a survey will increase or decrease, respectively, the probability for the project and the related payment to be implemented. As a consequence, if the sample size increases, the probability of a given response of being pivotal (that is, the probability of the response changing the final survey outcome) might decrease, weakening the individuals perception about own vote pivotality.

In the political literature, the concept of pivotality corresponds to the probability of a given vote to change the outcome of the election. Intuitively, a rational individual will go voting if the benefits from voting are superior to the cost. In the context of stated preference valuation literature, the issue of the response pivotality has been paid much less attention. Mitani and Flores (2012) asked the question whether consequential binary valuation tasks still ensure incentive-compatible behavior if the expected gain from answering becomes very small. In their considerations, they took into account that responding to a valuation choice task involves an effort and therefore increases the cost.[1] If the cost from voting is superior to the benefit, it is unclear why a rational individual would want to exert effort in a valuation task and respond truthfully. Mitani and Flores (2012) conducted an induced value experiment, in which they varied, among other things; sample sizes. The authors found that varying the sample size from 1 participant to 45 participants had no

[1]The authors state: "The cost of voting means any cost caused by making a voting decision, including a cognitive task of judging which alternative is better, time to make a vote, and/or participation in the voting decision".

impact on behavior (in their case the proportion of incentive compatible violation). Furthermore, the authors test the relationship between the group size and subjects subjective probability of being pivotal by conducting an incentivized guessing experiment utilizing a quadratic scoring rule. They find no relationship between sample size and subjective probability of being pivotal, which could indicate that people are not fully rationale. However, the authors are cautious in their conclusion since the number of participants is rather limited.[2]

In this paper, we test in a field experiment whether a higher sample size reduces the subjective consequentiality. We also explore the effects of the subjective consequentiality on willingness-to-pay and consider that the subjective consequentiality can be decomposed in at least two components as shown in Figure 1: a) the extent to which people think that their own response can influence the outcome of the study (hereafter called "*individual consequentiality*") and b) the extent to which they think the outcome of the study can influence policy makers (hereafter called "*survey consequentiality*"). Studies that assess the level of subjective consequentiality typically use a question of a type: do you think responses in this survey will influence the finally introduced outcome? This type of question may capture effects a) and b) simultaneously. While the majority of existing studies controlling for consequentiality perceptions considers consequentiality in general, we attempt to isolate to each of the effects and check their impact on willingness to pay.



Figure 1: Decomposition of the subjective pivotality

On this purpose, we report the results of an online split-sample survey concerning a water turbines program in France. The survey was conducted in March 2018 by a professional public opinion polling agency. A part of the sample is not provided with information on the sample size, like in most surveys. Another part is provided information on sample size just before the valuation choice question, where information varies across respondents in an attempt to manipulate and vary the subjective sample size. In the follow-up question stage, one question is used to elicit individual consequentiality (a) and another one for survey consequentiality (b).

[2]The authors state: "Thus, one might conclude that the pivotal probability does not affect a subjects truth revealing behavior in the referendum context although the biggest group size in our design is 45, which could be too small to observe the effect".

We find no link between sample size and subjective consequentiality, which is in line with Mitani and Flores (2012), and hence suggest that consequential single-bounded contingent valuation studies can still ensure incentive-compatible behavior when increasing the subjective sample size. We also find that both components (a) and (b) have a positive impact on willingness to pay. Implication for survey design will be discussed. The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the survey. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 provides a discussion and Section 5 concludes.

2 Survey

In France, a large part of the electricity comes from nuclear power (about 75%) and the share is expected to decrease to 50% by 2025 according to the French energy transition for green growth act voted in 2015.[3] Several programs of offshore wind turbines and underwater turbines are being considered, although in March 2018, when our survey was performed, none of the planned offshore and underwater turbines were operating.

The questionnaire was structured as follows. First, after a general introduction inviting people to respond to the survey, it was explained that the responses will be communicated to policy makers and therefore might influence policy makers. Second, information was provided on renewable energy and more specifically on underwater turbines. Pros and cons of underwater turbines were explained. Third, participants were described with a research program consisting of constructing and setting up two giant underwater turbines, of 16 meters in France. It was explained that the effect of the underwater turbines on fauna and flora would be studied and that the two turbines would produce electricity for about 5,000 households. The location of the underwater turbines was not provided. Fourth, the following valuation task was asked: "Would you be willing to pay X EUR a month during a year on your electricity bill for the set-up of this program (building and testing underwater turbines)?" Voluntary payment was avoided to avoid free riding. The following final bid amounts were retained based on a pre-test: 0.5; 2; 5; 10 and 20 EUR. Fifth, different debriefing questions were asked regarding the perception of the program and socio-demographic questions. Among other things, rating type questions were asked, with people being asked to assess how they agreed with the

[3] https://www.ecologique-solidaire.gouv.fr/loi-transition-energetique-croissance-verte (last consulted on 11 March 2019)

following statements between 1 ("I do not agree at all"), 2 ("I somewhat agree"), 3 ("neutral"), 4 ("I somewhat agree") and 5 ("I fully agree"): "This project is very important for France"; "The outcome of this survey will influence policy makers on the decision to implement or not the program" and "my valuation response can affect the outcome of the survey". The two latter statement aims at measuring (a) "individual consequentiality" and (b) "survey consequentiality" respectively. No information was asked to elicit the so-called payment consequentiality, i.e., whether people would really believe that the bill would be increased if the program was implemented, to limit survey length.

The survey was performed by a professional company which guaranteed that they would deliver a representative sample of the French population of at least 2,000 participants (the actual number was 2,023), where representativeness was based on three socio-demographic characteristics (gender, income and age). Regarding the experimental design, each individual was randomly allocated to one of four versions of the questionnaires. In the baseline version of the questionnaire, hereafter called V1, no information was provided on the questionnaire. In V2, a short sentence was added just before the valuation question: "at least 50 participants will participate to the survey". In V3, the sentence was: "at least 200 participants will participate to the survey" while in V4 it was "at least 2000 participants will participate to the survey". To ensure that people would read the above sentence in V2, V3 and V4 and would not be distracted by other information, there was little information on the screen, only the sentence and a short reminder that the results of the survey will provided to policy makers (see Appendix.A). Also, the sentence was worded in a way to change the subjective sample size, if any, while avoiding deception which is banned in economics and the participants had to wait for 5 seconds because they could push on next to ensure that the information on the slide would be read.

Focus groups and pre-tests showed that the survey was properly worded and that some persons were opposed to the program because it could potentially harm fauna and flora. In the final surveys, some of the person refused to pay for the program for this reason. Hence, possible negative WTP should be accounted for in the econometric treatment.

3 Results

Table 1 provides information on socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, where the continuous variable income corresponds to net monthly income

(expressed in thousands of euro) and the binary variable education take value 1 if the individual has at least the A-level. A non-parametric Kolmogorov test is performed successively for each of the six possible combinations (V1 versus V2; V2 versus V3, etc) and for each of the four socio-demographic variables (income, age, education, female). Results indicate that there is no difference of distribution across sub-samples at 5% statistical level for each of the four socio-demographic variables, which is not surprising given that the allocation to the different versions of the questionnaire was random.

	V1 (no info)	V2 (>50)	V3 (>200)	V4 (>2000)
Income	2.702	2.750	2.633	2.677
	(1.36)	(1.523)	(1.435)	(1.475)
Age	46.111	47.130	46.238	45.386
	(15.102)	(15.587)	(14.994)	(15.763)
Education	0.765	0.759	0.738	0.750
	(0.424)	(0.428)	(0.44)	0.434)
Female	0.506	0.504	0.498	0.513
	(0.500)	(0.500)	(0.500)	(0.500)
n	468	532	520	503

Table 1: Socio-demographic characteristics

In the rest of the paper, we consider several ways to construct the variables related to sample size, as can be seen in Table 2. This allows testing if the results are sensitive to the variable construction.

3.1 Sample size and consequentiality

Mean comparison across sub-samples indicates that there is no link between individual consequentiality and the (unobserved) subjective sample size, which is consistent with the results found by Mitani and Flores (2012). Indeed, the mean of *individual_consequentiality* is 0.43, 0.44, 0.42 and 0.43 in V1, V2, V3 and V4 respectively. The unpaired two-sample t-tests is applied for each of the possible combinations (V1 versus V2; V2 versus V3, etc) and the null hypothesis of equal mean WTP is never rejected at conventional levels. The logit model also suggests that sample size has no impact on the subjective individual consequentiality which is robust to the inclusion of socio-demographic characteristics (see Table 3).[4] In the logit model, the

[4]These results are also robust to the threshold retained to recode the consequential variables.

Sample size	
"Sample size information"	Binary variable that takes 1 if the respondent has been assigned the questionnaire version 1 (V1, no info), 0 if version 2 (V2, >50), version 3 (V3, >200) or version 4 (V4, >2,000).
Sample size	Continuous variable that takes value 50 if the respondent is assigned version 2 of the questionnaire (V2, >50), 200 if version 3 (V3, >200) and 2,000 if version 4 (V4, >2,000).
Sample_200	Binary variable that takes value 1 if the respondent has been assigned the version 3 (V3, >200) of the questionnaire, zero if version 2 (V2, >50) or version 4 (V4, >2,000).
Sample_2000	Binary variable that takes value 1 if the respondent has been assigned version 4 (V2, >2,000) of the questionnaire, zero if version 2 (V2, >50) or version 3 (V3, >200).
Consequentiality	
Individual_consequentiality	Binary variable that takes value 1 if the respondent reported a score of 4 ("I somewhat agree") or 5 ("I fully agree") to the statement "My valuation response can affect the outcome of the survey"; and value 0 if reporting 1 ("I do not agree at all"), 2 ("I somewhat disagree") or 3 ("neutral").
Survey_consequentiality	Binary variable that takes value 1 if the respondent reported a score of 4 ("I somewhat agree") or 5 ("I fully agree") to the statement "The outcome of this survey will influence policy makers on the decision to implement or not the program"; and value 0 if reporting 1 ("I do not agree at all"), 2 ("I somewhat disagree") or 3 ("neutral").

Table 2: Construction of variables related to sample size information and consequentiality

variables related to sample size (e.g., info) can be seen as instrumental variables for the (unobserved) subjective sample size, as it is expected to be correlated with the subjective sample size and not correlated with the explanatory variables since the treatment allocation is random.

It is worth noting that the conclusion does not change when replacing the dependent variable "individual consequentiality" by "survey consequentiality" or by a variable which takes value one if both variables (individual consequentiality and survey consequentiality) take one and zero otherwise.

3.2 Willingness to pay

The interval data regression model (Cameron, 1988) is employed to explore the determinants of WTP. This approach relies on the maximum likelihood estimation approach, which requires to assume a distribution for WTP. We retain the normal distribution to account for the possible negative WTP due to the possible impact

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Income				0.0682**	0.0760**	0.0767**
				(0.0330)	(0.0370)	(0.0370)
Education				0.174*	0.157	0.156
				(0.0970)	(0.111)	(0.111)
Female				-0.0891	-0.0786	-0.0779
				(0.0910)	(0.104)	(0.104)
log(Age)				-0.00978	0.00948	0.00883
				(0.129)	(0.146)	(0.146)
Sample size information	-0.00833			-0.00388		
	(0.106)			(0.107)		
Sample_200		-0.0842			-0.0753	
		(0.125)			(0.125)	
Sample_2000		-0.0424			-0.0337	
		(0.125)			(0.126)	
log(Sample size)			-0.00886			-0.00669
			(0.0338)			(0.0340)
Constant	-0.275***	-0.242***	-0.234	-0.470	-0.528	-0.526
	(0.0933)	(0.0873)	(0.195)	(0.504)	(0.569)	(0.602)
Observations	2,023	1,555	1,555	2,023	1,555	1,555

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3: Logistic Regression Model of the individual consequentiality

of the program on fauna and flora. Therefore, WTP_i is a linear function of a row vector of covariates, x_i such that $WTP_i = x_i \beta + \epsilon_i$ where β is a column vector of unknown parameters and ϵ_i is a normally distributed zero-mean error term with standard deviation σ_i. Since the variance of the error term may depend on the experimental design (i.e., the variance may differ across sample size), we allow for heteroscasticity (see Vossler and Holladay (2018) and Vossler and Zawojska (2018) for recent examples using the same approach). In this interval data model, "yes" and "no" responses are considered as censored data, since the only information which is observed is whether the WTP is above or below the assigned bid amount.

Table 4 displays 6 models which differ in term of independent variables. Models 1, 2 and 3 only includes variables related to sample size, while the other models include additional variables, namely sociodemographic and consequentiality. Models 1, 2 and 3 show that the information on sample size has no effect on willingness-to-pay, regardless of the sample size variable construction. The coefficients are not statistically significant from zero at conventional levels. Results also suggest that the variance of the error term is also not statistically significant from zero at conventional statistical levels, hence suggesting that increasing the sample size does

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Coefficient parameters						
Income				0.981***	1.148***	1.151***
				(0.367)	(0.445)	(0.443)
Education				1.637	2.007	1.991
				(1.048)	(1.279)	(1.273)
Female				-3.697***	-3.959***	-3.951***
				(1.010)	(1.251)	(1.244)
log(Age)				-0.626	-0.0242	0.0465
				(1.382)	(1.683)	(1.663)
Survey_consequentiality				7.489***	7.456***	7.418***
				(1.389)	(1.707)	(1.699)
Individual_consequentiality				6.988***	7.831***	7.734***
				(1.359)	(1.707)	(1.673)
Sample size information	0.636			0.693		
	(0.994)			(1.069)		
Sample_200		-1.288			-1.185	
		(1.330)			(1.396)	
Sample_2000		-0.816			-0.517	
		(1.509)			(1.474)	
log(Sample size)			-0.170			-0.136
			(0.372)			(0.404)
Constant	6.696***	8.073***	8.269***	1.349	-0.519	-0.539
	(0.821)	(1.044)	(2.118)	(5.402)	(6.578)	(6.894)
Standard errors						
Sample size information	0.235			0.177		
	(0.149)			(0.114)		
Sample_200		-0.255			0.133	
		(0.195)			(0.146)	
Sample_2000		0.0257			0.218	
		(0.219)			(0.148)	
log(Sample size)			0.0170			0.0587
			(0.0523)			(0.0409)
Constant	2.603***	2.920***	2.743***	2.651***	2.746***	2.530***
	(0.124)	(0.151)	(0.299)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.236)
Observations	2,023	1,555	1,555	2,023	1,555	1,555

Table 4: Interval data regression model

not lead to more random answers. The same results are obtained when including socio-demographic and questions on consequentiality: the sample size has no effect on WTP and the variance of error term. We also find that the level of income has a positive effect on WTP, which is consistent with a priori expectation. Also, people who believe that the outcome of this survey will influence policy makers on the decision to implement or not the program (survey consequentiality) tend to state higher willingness-to-pay. The same pattern is observed for those who believe that their response can affect the outcome of the survey (individual consequentiality). Note that these results are robust to the threshold retained to recode the consequential variables (either 3 or 4, out of 5). We also created a series of interaction variables between the two consequential variables but results were not statistically different.

Table 5 displays the mean WTP and confidence interval from the interval data model without covariate and the Turnbull approach. The null hypothesis of equal mean WTP is rejected for each of the possible combinations and for both parametric and non-parametric analysis. Figure 2 shows the survival distribution for each of the treatments. The survival distributions are close, hence supporting the finding that the information on sample size has no effect on willingness to pay.

	Description	V1 (no info)	V2 (>50)	V3 (>200)	V4 (>2,000)
Mean WTP (Std error)					
Parametric	Mean WTP	6.696 (0.821)	8.073 (1.044)	6.785 (0.825)	7.257 (1.090)
	Confidence interval	[5.086;8.304]	[6.027;10.119]	[5.169;8.401]	[5.121;9.394]
Non-parametric	Turnbull Mean WTP	6.525 (0.497)	7.864 (0.548)	6.712 (0.490)	7.532 (0.543)
	Confidence interval	[5.551;7.499]	[6.790;8.938]	[5.752;7.672]	[6.468;8.596]

Table 5: Parametric and non-parametric mean WTP and confidence intervals

We now turn to the analysis of response time, where the response time corresponds to the number of seconds taken by participants to answer the following valuation question: "Would you be willing to pay X EUR a month during a year on your electricity bill for the set-up of this program (building and testing underwater turbines)?" A full slide was devoted to the valuation question, with no additional script/information being displayed on it except the "yes" or "no" answer. Table 6



Figure 2: Survival distribution

shows that there is little difference across treatments. For instance, the median is identical (11 seconds). The non-parametric Kolmogorov test is employed to compare the distributions and the null hypothesis of identical distribution is never rejected, hence suggesting that the level of effort invested in the valuation task does not differ across treatments.

Percentile	V1	V2	V3	V4
1%	4	4	4	3
5%	5	6	5	5
10%	7	6	6	6
25%	8	8	8	8
50%	11	11	11	11
75%	14	14	15	14
90%	18	21	22	20

Table 6: Number of seconds taken to answer the valuation question

4 Discussion

One contribution of our paper to the literature is to give additional evidence that people fail to make the link between subjective sample size and subjective consequentiality, which is consistent with Mitani and Flores (2012) who performed an induced experiment that involved 45 participants, hence suggesting that consequen-

tial single bounded contingent valuation studies can still ensure incentive-compatible behavior when increasing the subjective sample size. Indeed, while the actual benefits from voting decreases with the sample size, the subjective benefits would remain the same, which would explain why people do not increase the effort in the valuation task (as shown by response time). This supports the use of single bounded dichotomous choice surveys. However, this result is surprising given that political literature has shown that the number of participants could impact the turnout in election. However, the mechanism is a bit more complex in valuation since the link between the survey and policy maker's decision is limited. If there is a majority of "yes" respondents, the program may or may not be implemented in reality.

Another contribution of our paper regarding the literature on consequentiality is to decompose the policy consequentiality into two components and check the effect of each of the components on willingness to pay. We find that each of the effects is highly significant and has a positive effect on willingness-to-pay. Asking two questions rather than a single one may present some appeals. First, it may be easier for the respondents. Consider the following question: "Do you think that your response and the one from the other respondents will influence policy makers?" If an individual thinks that the other responses will influence policy makers but not his/her (e.g., the vast majority of the participant will favor the program butnot him/her), it is unclear whether she should respond "yes" or "no". Second, misleading conclusion could be drawn if future research showed that the two components could have an opposite effect on WTP and their effect would cancel out. This would suggest that there is no need to control for consequentiality although it actually impact results. A drawback of asking two questions instead of one is that it increases the survey length.

Our study suffers from possible limitations, which we tried to overcome. First, the information on sample size can affect protest answers or create a selection bias (i.e., people refusing to take part of the survey if the sample is too high or too low), and therefore alter the comparison across treatments. However, we did not provide the information on sample size at the beginning of the survey to avoid selection bias. As for the protest answers, the rate of protest answers is not statistically different across treatments (the protest rate is 0.084, 0.083, 0.080 and 0.092 in V1, V2, V3 and V4 respectively and the t-test mean comparison fails to be rejected for each of the possible combination) and the exclusion of the protest answers does

not change any conclusion from the paper.[5] Another possible limitation is that providing information on sample size can potentially change the perception of the good. When the sample size is big, participants may think that the good to be valued is "important". If so, difference of mean willingness to pay could have been observed across treatments. However, we do not find any difference of mean WTP, nor did we find correlation between the variable "importance" and the variable related to sample size, hence suggesting that it does not change the perception of the good (correlation). Finally, one may argue that increasing the sample size has no impact on subjective consequentiality because of the expected results. If the individual thinks that 90% of the participants will vote yes, then the vote is not perceived as consequential, even when the sample size is small. In the follow-up stage, we asked the participants to predict other's people response and to estimate at which level they think that a level will impact the decision. Even when controlling for the condition vote; the information on sample size has no impact on consequentiality, nor on willingness-to-pay, which reinforces the conclusion.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we test in a single-bounded dichotomous choice survey dealing with underwater turbines whether providing information on sample size has an impact on willingness-to-pay. We find that there is no effect, and conclude that consequential binary contingent valuation studies can still ensure incentive-compatible behavior when the gain from voting becomes very small. Overall, this gives some support to the use of the single bounded dichotomous choice surveys. Future studies could check if the two considered components of consequentiality also affect behaviors in choice experiment, or if sample size matters. Conditional voting requires an important effort (i.e., predict the vote for each of the alternatives and voting among the top two alternatives) and it might not be worth investing this effort when the sample size is high and the probability to affect the outcome is therefore low.

[5]There is no clear consensus in the literature on whether or not to keep protest answers. In this paper, we decided to keep all the answers, but the results without protest answers, which are available upon request to the authors, remain the same.

Acknowledgements

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Appendix

A. Slide positioned just before the valuation question

Version of the questionnaire: V1 (no information)



Note: the button "Next" appears after 5 seconds.

Version of the questionnaire: V2 (> 50)



Note: the button "Next" appears after 5 seconds.

Version of the questionnaire: V3 (> 200)



Note: the button "Next" appears after 5 seconds.